

ON-FILE NSC  
RELEASE  
INSTRUCTIONS  
APPLY

**TOP SECRET SENSITIVE**

DOS, NAVY, DIA,  
Reviews Completed

VZCZCWHE151  
OO WTE19  
DE WTE 7356 3232044  
O 192047Z NOV 74  
FM SITUATION ROOM//TOHAK 30//  
TO GENERAL SCOWCROFT  
ZEM  
T O P S E C R E T SENSITIVE CONTAINS CODEWORD  
DELIVER AT OPENING OF BUSINESS WH43339

TOHAK 30

NOVEMBER 19, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY KISSINGER

FROM: THE SITUATION ROOM

SUBJECT: ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ITEMS

SOVIET NAVAL ACTIVITY: TWO KANIN-CLASS GUIDED-MISSILE DESTROYERS UNDER THE COMMAND OF COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, SOVIET NORTHERN FLEET, COMPLETED A FIVE-DAY VISIT TO NORWAY ON NOVEMBER 17. COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, SOVIET BLACK SEA FLEET, EMBARKED IN A KYNDA-CLASS GUIDED-MISSILE CRUISER WILL CALL AT LATAKIA, SYRIA, FROM THE 20TH TO THE 25TH; A KASHIN-CLASS GUIDED-MISSILE DESTROYER AND AN F-CLASS SUBMARINE WILL ACCOMPANY HER. FOLLOWING A NOVEMBER 5 TO 10 CALL TO EQUATORIAL GUINEA, GUIDED-MISSILE HELICOPTER CRUISER LENINGRAD WITH A KASHIN-CLASS ESCORT AND A NAVAL OILER ARE SCHEDULED TO PUT IN AT DAKAR, SENEGAL, FROM THE 19TH TO THE 23D EN ROUTE TO THE MEDITERRANEAN; A SPACE-SUPPORT SHIP MAY JOIN THEM IN DAKAR. THESE SAME UNITS -- LESS THE SPACE-SUPPORT SHIP -- COULD VISIT CASABLANCA, MOROCCO, NEXT MONTH. A PETYA-CLASS DESTROYER ESCORT JUST CONCLUDED A FOUR-DAY STOPOVER AT BIZERTE, TUNISIA, ON THE 17TH, THE FIRST SOVIET NAVAL SHIP TO VISIT THERE. IN THE INDIAN OCEAN, A KOTLIN-CLASS DESTROYER, POSSIBLY ACCOMPANIED BY A PETYA-CLASS ESCORT AND AN OILER, IS BELIEVED TO BE CALLING AT MALE, MALDIVES REPUBLIC, DURING THE SAME TIME FRAME. A SPACE-SUPPORT UNIT TRANSITING FROM THE ATLANTIC WILL PROBABLY CALL AT PORT LOUIS, MAURITIUS, ON THE 25TH. ALTHOUGH THERE IS NO APPARENT CORRELATION BETWEEN THESE CALLS, [REDACTED] TAKEN TOGETHER WITH THE SIMULTANEOUS OUT-OF-AREA OFFICIAL JUNKETS BY TWO FLEET COMMANDERS, THEY REPRESENT AN UNUSUALLY HIGH LEVEL OF SHOW-THE-FLAG ACTIVITY.

25X1

CSCE TALKS: THE U.S. DELEGATION AT THE CSCE TALKS IN GENEVA REPORTS THE SOVIETS HAVE BEGUN WITH INCREASING FREQUENCY TO

END OF PAGE 01

**TOP SECRET SENSITIVE**

**TOP SECRET SENSITIVE**

ACCUSE THE WEST GERMANS OF OBSTRUCTIONISM AT CSCE. THESE ACCUSATIONS HAVE BECOME MORE EXPLICIT SINCE WEST GERMAN CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT'S VISIT TO THE USSR. THE U.S. DELEGATION NOTES THAT THE SOVIETS MAY RAISE THIS ISSUE AT VLADIVOSTOK. THE FRG HAS SPECIAL CONCERNS AT CSCE -- INCLUDING GETTING WORDING THAT WOULD THEORETICALLY PERMIT SOME FUTURE PEACEFUL REUNIFICATION OF GERMANY -- AND BONN'S DEFENSE OF ITS INTERESTS HAS AT TIMES IMPEDED SOVIET DESIRES FOR A QUICK CONCLUSION TO THE CONFERENCE. STEPPED-UP SOVIET COMPLAINTS ABOUT BONN'S "OBSTRUCTIONISM" MAY BE ANOTHER EXAMPLE OF THE DIVISIVE TACTICS MOSCOW HAS USED IN AN EFFORT TO BREAK WESTERN UNITY AT THE TALKS.

SOVIET ATTITUDE ON THE KHMER CREDENTIALS: EMBASSY PHNOM PENH REPORTS THAT A TASS CORRESPONDENT THERE HAS FILED A STORY GENERALLY SUPPORTING OUR EFFORTS IN THE UN. THE KEY SECTIONS OF THE STORY STATE THAT:

-- [REDACTED] THE  
SOVIET UNION IS FAVORABLY DISPOSED TOWARD  
NEGOTIATIONS AMONG KHMERS WITHOUT PRIOR CON-  
DITIONS, AS WAS OFFERED BY THE GKR."

25X1

-- "IF THE SOVIET UNION HELPS SIHANOUK ENTER  
THE UN IT WILL BY THIS ACT STRENGTHEN THE  
GROUP OF PRO-PEKING SATELLITES."

WE, OF COURSE, DO NOT KNOW WHETHER THIS ARTICLE REFLECTS AN OFFICIAL SOVIET POSITION. EMBASSY PHNOM PENH CONSIDERS THE CORRESPONDENT AS THE HIGHEST RANKING SOVIET "OFFICIAL" NOW IN CAMBODIA, BUT WE HAVE NO INDICATION OF THE EXTENT OF HIS INFLUENCE IN MOSCOW. HOWEVER, THERE HAVE BEEN SEVERAL OTHER INDICATIONS THAT THE SOVIETS ARE NOT STRONGLY SUPPORTING THE GRUNK EFFORT AT THE UN. (QUINN/STEARMAN)

LE DUC THO TO VISIT PARIS: LE DUC THO LEFT HANOI ON NOVEMBER 18 FOR A TEN DAY VISIT TO PARIS. EN ROUTE HE WILL STOP IN PEKING AND MOSCOW. THIS IS OSTENSIBLY A PERSONAL VISIT DURING WHICH HE WILL MEET WITH FRENCH COMMUNIST PARTY OFFICIALS. SOME SOUTH VIETNAMESE DIPLOMATS INITIALLY SPECULATED YOU MIGHT MEET WITH THO AGAIN; HOWEVER, YOUR TRIP TO THE FAR EAST HAS ENDED THIS SPECULATION. (QUINN/STEARMAN)

25X1

END OF PAGE 02

**TOP SECRET SENSITIVE**

**TOP SECRET SENSITIVE**

25X1

OPPOSITION GAINS IN BRAZIL ELECTIONS -- GOVERNMENT RESPONSE AWAITED: THE OPPOSITION MDB STARTLED MOST OBSERVERS BY WINNING 12 TO 15 OUT OF 21 SENATORIAL ELECTIONS, 3 TO 4 STATE LEGISLATURES, AND A ONE-THIRD MINORITY IN THE LOWER HOUSE IN BRAZIL. THIS WILL PERMIT THE OPPOSITION IN THE HOUSE TO ESTABLISH COMMITTEES OF INQUIRY AND TO INTERPELLATE CABINET MINISTERS. THE OPPOSITION GAINS ARE ASCRIBED TO THE DETERIORATION IN THE ECONOMIC SITUATION, BETTER CALIBER OF MDB CANDIDATES, AND THE OPEN AND FREE WAY IN WHICH THE ELECTION WAS CONDUCTED. MDB SPOKESMEN HAVE BEEN EMPHASIZING THE RESPONSIBLE ROLE THAT THEY PLAN TO TAKE IN AN EFFORT TO HEAD OFF ANY NEGATIVE REACTION FROM THE GOVERNMENT. IT CAN BE EXPECTED THAT HARD LINE MILITARY OFFICERS WILL INTERPRET THE VOTE AS A SLAP AGAINST THE MILITARY REGIME AND WILL PRESS PRESIDENT GEISEL TO TAKE MEASURES AGAINST IT. SO FAR THE PRESIDENT HAS STOUTLY RESISTED ADVICE OF THIS KIND FROM THIS QUARTER. (LOW)

POSSIBLE HONDURAN COUP: THE EMBASSY IN TEGUCIGALPA REPORTS THAT A MEETING OF THE NATIONAL DEFENSE COUNCIL ON NOVEMBER 19 MAY SERVE AS THE OCCASION TO LIMIT THE POWER OF PRESIDENT LOPEZ SHARPLY OR TO REPLACE HIM ALTOGETHER. WIDESPREAD DISSATISFACTION WITHIN THE MILITARY OVER THE FAILURE OF GENERAL LOPEZ TO GET HONDURAS MOVING TOWARD ITS DEVELOPMENT GOALS IS THE CHIEF CAUSE OF DISSATISFACTION. IF LOPEZ IS REPLACED, IT WOULD PROBABLY BE BY A JUNTA. IF HE REMAINS, IT WOULD BE ON THE SUFFERANCE AND UNDER THE DIRECTION OF THE MILITARY, WHICH WOULD PLAY A MUCH MORE ACTIVE ROLE IN GOVERNMENT DECISION-MAKING. IN EITHER CASE, THE SUCCESSORS ARE LIKELY TO BE DEVELOPMENT-MINDED AND TO PRESENT NO THREAT TO U.S. INTERESTS IN HONDURAS. (LOW)

1132

7356

**TOP SECRET SENSITIVE**

NNNN